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Abstract Health policy instruments such as the public
financing of health technologies (e.g., new drugs, vaccines)
entail consequences in multiple domains. Fundamentally,
public health policies aim at increasing the uptake of
effective and efficient interventions and at subsequently
leading to better health benefits (e.g., premature mortality
and morbidity averted). In addition, public health policies
can provide non-health benefits in addition to the sole well-
being of populations and beyond the health sector. For
instance, public policies such as social and health insurance
programs can prevent illness-related impoverishment and
procure financial risk protection. Furthermore, public
policies can improve the distribution of health in the pop-
ulation and promote the equalization of health among
individuals. Extended cost-effectiveness analysis was
developed to address health policy assessment, specifically
to evaluate the health and financial consequences of public
policies in four domains: (1) the health gains; (2) the
financial risk protection benefits; (3) the total costs to the
policy makers; and (4) the distributional benefits. Here, we
present a tutorial that describes both the intent of extended
cost-effectiveness analysis and its keys to allow easy
implementation for health policy assessment.
Key Points for Decision Markers
Extended cost-effectiveness analysis (ECEA)
fundamentally builds on cost-effectiveness analysis
and provides quantitative methods for health policy
assessment. It examines public policies, whether
health or inter-sectoral policies, and policy
instruments that have an impact on the health of
populations.
ECEA further assesses the health and financial
consequences of policies, including financial risk
protection and disaggregated outcomes per
population stratum of interest.
The ECEA approach permits the inclusion of non-
health benefits (financial risk protection) and
distributional consequences or equity in the
economic evaluation of health policies. It enables the
consideration of key criteria into the resource
allocation problem and into the design of the health
benefits package.
1 Background
Economic evaluations for health, cost-effectiveness anal-
yses, or CEAs, have essentially focused on quantifying the
health gains per given expenditure on a health intervention
[1–3]. In this accounting exercise, the health benefits can
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include directly measurable outcomes such as deaths
averted or disease cases averted, or can rely on constructed
metrics such as quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) gained
or disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) averted. The
research analyst often expresses incremental cost-effec-
tiveness ratios as dollars per death averted, dollars per
DALY averted, or dollars per QALY gained. As a result,
CEA has been largely dedicated to the economic evaluation
of health interventions and in particular of new technolo-
gies and drugs (e.g., vaccines, cancer drugs), often to
identify the ‘best buys’ and ‘magic bullets’, which ulti-
mately policy makers and governmental bodies may pro-
mote in a publicly financed benefits package.
Yet, many have argued that CEA in health should move
towards explicit consideration of the multiple dimensions
and outcomes that ensue from health policies. For instance,
financial risk protection (FRP, the attenuation or prevention
of illness-related impoverishment) on the outcome side and
the use of scarce health system capacity on the financial
side should be included [3]. As an illustration, Kim and
colleagues have analyzed the effect of health system con-
straints on optimal resource allocation in the context of
cervical cancer screening [4], and Rheingans and others
have examined the distributional impact of rotavirus
immunization [5], in low- and middle-income countries.
Policy makers in ministries of health and ministries of
finance rarely make their financial allocations solely based
on CEA findings maximizing health gains per dollar spent,
but rather examine a range of criteria before assigning
resources within and outside the health sector. In many
countries, equity and fairness dimensions are integral to the
rationing process, and numerous tradeoffs stand out that can
directly conflict with the sole efficiency figure of merit of
cost per QALY gained as provided by a CEA [6]. Therefore,
analytical frameworks attempting to capture the multiple
criteria involved in the decision-making process have been
developed [7]. A number of mathematical models have
either focused on the explicit incorporation of some form of
equity or population distributions into the resource allocation
and decision-making problems [8–15], or have proposed to
display analysis findings and outcomes in a disaggregated
manner in the form of a dashboard [7, 16].
Within their primary mandate of improving or main-
taining health, the World Health Organization character-
ized health systems as having three fundamental
objectives: (1) to improve health and the distribution of
health in the population; (2) to enhance responsiveness to
the expectations of the population; and (3) to promote
fairness in the financial contribution towards health [17].
After World War II in Western Europe, national health
systems were designed with one of the fundamental intents
being to prevent illness-related impoverishment and to
provide FRP to the populations they serve. For example,
the opening page of the United Kingdom’s National Health
Service document of July 5, 1948 reads ‘‘there are no
charges, except for a few special items. There are no
insurance qualifications. But it is not a ‘charity.’ You are
all paying for (the National Health Service), mainly as
taxpayers, and it will relieve your money worries in times
of illness’’ [18].
FRP objectives are critical in low- and middle-income
countries where social insurance programs such as sick
leave and unemployment coverage fail to cover large parts
of the population. Protection from financial risks associated
with healthcare expenses has emerged as a critical com-
ponent of national health strategies in many countries.
Indeed, out-of-pocket medical payments can lead to
impoverishment with households choosing from among
many coping strategies (e.g., borrowing from relatives,
asset selling) to manage health-related expenses. Despite
other financing mechanisms, household medical expendi-
tures can often be ‘catastrophic’, defined as exceeding a
certain fraction of total household expenditures [19].
Attention to illness-related impoverishment has been
heightened with the recent institution of the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) by the United Nations in
September 2015. SDG1 calls for ‘‘ending poverty in all its
forms by 2030’’; and SDG3, the health-related SDG, pre-
sents a sub-target on achieving ‘‘universal health coverage,
including FRP and access to quality essential health ser-
vices’’ [20].
Health inequalities are very substantial both across and
within countries. Large variations in health outcomes
across socioeconomic groups and the social determinants
of health have long been demonstrated [21]. In the USA,
for example, recent investigations have pointed to the wide
differences in mortality outcomes and life expectancy at
birth between states and racial groups [22, 23]. Inequalities
in healthcare use also exist where often access to health
services can be concentrated among the richer socioeco-
nomic groups or well-off regions. For instance, in many
low- and middle-income countries (e.g., Ethiopia), wealthy
individuals can use essential health services two to three
times more readily than poorer individuals [24].
One major objective of public policy making is to
remove societies’ inequalities. In particular, health policy
instruments fundamentally aim at increasing the uptake of
effective and efficient interventions and subsequently lead
to greater health benefits (e.g., premature mortality and
morbidity averted). In addition, they can generate non-
health benefits beyond the mere well-being of citizens and
outside the health sector. For instance, public policies such
as health insurance programs can prevent illness-related
impoverishment and improve the distribution of health in
populations towards the equalization of health among
individuals. Specifically, extended CEA (ECEA) [25] was
914 S. Verguet et al.
conceived for health policy assessment (HPA), i.e., to
evaluate the health and financial consequences of health
policies in four domains: (1) the health gains; (2) the FRP
(prevention of illness-related impoverishment) benefits; (3)
the total costs of the policy to the decision makers; and (4)
the distributional (e.g., across socioeconomic groups)
consequences. In this respect, ECEA highlights the returns
on investment in the dimensions of equity and FRP, in
addition to health benefits, per given budget expenditure on
policy. This article proposes a practical tutorial to conduct
ECEA for HPA.
2 Extended Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: Praxis
2.1 Health Policy Assessment
ECEA examines public policies, whether health or inter-
sectoral policies, which have an impact on the health of
populations, and is fundamentally concerned with policy
instruments. Jamison [3] divides policy instruments into
the following categories: mass education campaigns, legal
and regulatory policies, financial policies (e.g., taxation,
subsidies, user fees, and conditional cash transfers), engi-
neering policies, and direct government provision of ser-
vices or training. Examples can include: universal public
finance (government financing of an intervention irre-
spective of whom is receiving it) or pro-poor public finance
(government financing of an intervention targeting poorer
segments of the population) for a package of immuniza-
tions; excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol products; a law
enforcing a restriction on the salt content of breads;
pedestrian pathways, speed bumps, and roundabouts.
The first step for the research analyst is thus to select a
policy instrument of interest, denoted HP in what follows,
for examination in a given population P. As often, the
population P can be segmented and best interpreted
through distinct population subgroups (denoted Pk, with
1 B k B n). The indexation k may define a segmentation
by socioeconomic status (e.g., per income quintile), by
region or subnational geographical unit in a country (e.g.,
per province, state, county, district, municipality), by eth-
nicity or by sex, for example. Evidently, the definition and
selection of the population subgroups k will depend on the
specific questions, including equity and distributional
issues, the analyst is posing. The second step is to specify
an intervention provided by the policy instrument HP (e.g.,
vaccine for preventing rotavirus, treatment for stroke,
prevention of road traffic injury), which will have a given
coverage (i.e., Cov) and a given efficacy or effectiveness
(i.e., Eff) towards prevention or treatment of the illness or
condition. Enactment of the policy HP also entails a given
net cost (i.e., C) to the implementer.
The purpose of the ECEA methodology is to quantita-
tively examine HPA. In pursuing HPA, ECEA explicitly
quantifies the following four consequences per population
subgroup Pk for a given HP: (1) the health benefits pro-
cured by the policy; (2) the private expenditures and costs
averted by the policy; (3) the FRP benefits provided by the
policy; and (4) the total net costs of the policy (Fig. 1).
2.2 Quantifying the Health Gains
The implementation of policy HP first leads to health gains
distinctly accruing in each population subgroup Pk. ECEA
estimates the distributional health consequences (e.g., deaths
averted, DALYs averted) per population stratum Pk. To do
so, we need to a priori know the distribution of health in the
population. For instance, ECEA may require data inputs on
the mortality attributable to a specific disease targeted by the
policy HP per income quintile in the population (Fig. 2a). In
other words, information on the relevant disease burden Dk
per specific population stratum is necessary.
ECEA quantifies the health benefits procured by HP.
These benefits depend notably on: the ex-ante disease
burden (i.e., Dk), the coverage of the intervention achieved
by population subgroup (i.e., Covk), and the effectiveness
of the intervention, potentially per population subgroup
(i.e., Effk). Using a simple static disease model, the esti-
mation of the health gains (i.e., BH,k) could be expressed in
the following way:
BH;k ¼ Effk  Covk  Dk: ð1Þ
Therefore, ECEA uses the exact same approach as a
traditional CEA except that it examines the health gains
Fig. 1 Conceptual structure of the extended cost-effectiveness anal-
ysis methodology where policy impact is estimated in four domains
across distinct wealth strata of the country population: (1) health
gains; (2) private expenditures averted; (3) prevention of illness-
related impoverishment or financial risk protection provided; and (4)
cost to the implementer
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procured across k population subgroups in lieu of 1 in the
case of CEA. In other words, ECEA only studies one
specific type of health equity impact (i.e., the distribution
of health outcomes).
Consider for example the case of tuberculosis (TB) in
country ‘Land’ with a population of 10 million (2 million
per income quintile). In Land, TB incidence is 200 per
100,000 population per year on average, and is 400, 300,
200, 100, and 0 per 100,000 among the five country income
quintiles, lowest to highest. Case fatality ratio from TB is
20 %, TB treatment is 80 % effective, and current treat-
ment coverage is 50 % and uniform across each income
quintile. Assume an increase in treatment coverage of
10 %, equally across the five income groups, through
universal public finance (UPF). Using a simple static dis-
ease model, UPF for TB treatment in Land would lead to
the following TB-related deaths averted per income
quintile:
BH ¼ 0:80  0:10  0:20  8000; 6000; 4000; 2000; 0f g
¼ 128; 96; 64; 32; 0f g:
ð2Þ
UPF for TB treatment in Land would avert a total of
320 TB-related deaths, 40 % of which would occur among
the poorest.
2.3 Quantifying the Financial Consequences
for Individuals
ECEA takes the perspective of the individuals affected by
illness and examines the ensuing illness-related financial
consequences they face. With the onset of illness, affected
individuals’ financial burden can include: the direct pay-
ment of medical care out of pocket (denoted cDM), direct
non-medical costs (most importantly transportation costs to
seek care) out of pocket (denoted cDNM), and time and
productivity losses, which can be translated into wages and
income foregone (often named indirect or friction costs)
(denoted cI). All such financial implications may vary by
population subgroup (i.e., cDM,k, cDNM,k, cI,k). For example,
some may visit private health facilities rather than public
facilities, which may lead to a differential in out-of-pocket
costs.
Similar to the quantification of health gains, the analyst
must obtain prior information on the relevant financial
burden to individuals tied to the specific illnesses and
conditions addressed by the policy HP (Fig. 2b). In other
words, we must obtain data inputs on the amount of private
expenditures and costs, denoted PEk, incurred by individ-
uals. Denote ik and uk, the incidence of illness and the
healthcare use for illness treatment (e.g., probability of
seeking care conditional on having the disease) per popu-
lation subgroup, respectively. The amount of private
expenditures incurred by individuals in the population
subgroup Pk could be expressed as:
1
PEk ¼ ik  uk  ðcDM;k þ cDNM;kÞ: ð3Þ
The implementation of policy HP may lead to the
‘crowding out’ of these individual private expenditures.
That is to say HP can, partially or totally, remove PEk,
leading to ‘private expenditures crowded out.’
(b)(a)
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Private expenditures due to disease D2
Fig. 2 Estimated distribution across income quintiles in country ‘Land’ of: (a) deaths attributable to diseases D1 and D2 and (b) private
expenditures (e.g. out-of-pocket direct medical costs) attributable to the treatment of diseases D1 and D2
1 Note that formula (3) may be generalized to include prevention.
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ECEA further disaggregates what is named the ‘societal’
perspective in traditional economic evaluations [2], to
precisely examine the perspective of individuals and esti-
mate the amount of private expenditures (e.g., direct
medical costs, direct non-medical costs, indirect costs) that
could be averted by policy. Again, using a simple modeling
approach, the private expenditures averted (i.e., PEav,k)
could take the following mathematical expression:
PEav;k ¼ Covk  PEk: ð4Þ
Consider the case of TB in Land, where 40 % of TB-
infected individuals would purchase TB treatment entirely
out of pocket at cDM,k = $100. After UPF for TB
treatment, they would no longer spend money out of
pocket for TB treatment. The amount of private
expenditures averted by UPF would then be:
PEav ¼ 0:40  8000; 6000; 4000; 2000; 0f g  100
¼ $ 320000; 240000; 160000; 80000; 0f g: ð5Þ
In other words, UPF for TB treatment in Land would
avert a total of $800,000 of private expenditures, 40 % of
which would be averted within the poorest income quintile.
2.4 Estimating Financial Risk Protection
Once the amount of private expenditures that may be
‘crowded out’ is estimated (Sect. 2.3), ECEA attempts to
‘scale’ this amount of expenditures by disposable income
at the individual level, to estimate the FRP provided by the
policy. In other words, ECEA tries to account for the fact
that an individual that has an annual income of $100,000
and a loss of $10 remains much less severely impacted than
an individual who has an annual income of $100.
To estimate FRP, several metrics can be used including:
(1) the number of cases of catastrophic health costs aver-
ted, estimating the number of individuals no longer
crossing a ‘catastrophic’ threshold of income (e.g., 10, 20,
40 % of income) as a result of the costs faced [19, 26]; (2)
the number of cases of poverty averted, estimating the
number of individuals no longer crossing a given ‘poverty
line’ (e.g., national poverty line or international poverty
line of $1.90 per day as given by the World Bank [27]) as a
result of the costs faced [28]; and (3) a money-metric value
of insurance provided, quantifying the willingness to pay or
insurance risk premiums associated with the policy
[25, 29, 30].
Each metric (1-2-3) implies a mathematical formulation
involving both expenditures and costs incurred by indi-
viduals and their disposable income (denoted y in what
follows). In the estimation procedure, one should use the
individual income when it is available from the data inputs;
otherwise, one should construct an income distribution in
the population. For example, one possibility is to use as a
proxy a Gamma distribution of income in the population
easily constructed from gross national income per capita
and Gini coefficient [27]. Specifically, a Gamma distribu-
tion requires two parameters that can be expressed from
two inputs capturing both a mean (e.g., gross national
income per capita) and a dispersion (e.g., Gini). The cor-
responding algorithmic implementation is described in
great detail elsewhere [31, 32].
The unit of analysis selected for income may be at the
individual or household levels. The time frame over which
the income is evaluated may be annual or another length.
These choices will depend on the availability of data inputs
and on the point of view of the policy examined and the
policy maker.
For the estimation of FRP, the analyst should use one
metric among the three distinct metrics that we now detail.
2.4.1 Cases of Catastrophic Health Costs Averted
Given a specific income threshold Th, a case of catas-
trophic health cost is counted when at the individual level
we have the realization: cDM;k þ cDNM;k
 
[ y  Th.
Hence, the FRP afforded by the policy will correspond
to the counting of the number of cases of catastrophic
health costs averted owing to the reduction in the incidence
of: ik * uk * (cDM,k ? cDNM,k).
This corresponds to a direct comparison of the number
of cases of catastrophic health costs before and after the
policy, with a numerical integration along the income
distribution of the population targeted.
2.4.2 Cases of Poverty Averted
Given a specific income poverty line Pl, a case of poverty is
counted when at the individual level, we have the two real-
izations: (i) y[Pl, and (ii) y - (cDM,k ? cDNM,k)\Pl.
Hence, the FRP afforded by the policy will correspond
to the number of cases of poverty averted owing to the
reduction in the incidence of: ik * uk * (cDM,k ? cDNM,k).
This corresponds to a direct comparison of the number
of cases of poverty incurred before and after the policy,
with a numerical integration along the income distribution
of the population targeted.
2.4.3 Money-Metric Value of Insurance
We can use a utility-based model where risk-averse indi-
viduals value protection from the risk of uncertain adverse
events [25, 29, 30, 33–36]. We estimate the expected value
of the gamble associated with the eventuality of the disease
treatment with probability ik * uk and cost ck. We use a
constant relative risk aversion utility function: w yð Þ ¼ y1r
1r
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for r[ 0 and r = 1, where r is the Arrow–Pratt coefficient
of relative risk aversion. Following a long line of literature
[35–41], a coefficient of relative risk aversion r = 3 (high
degree of risk aversion) is often used. However, opinions
diverge in the literature over the value of r [42–47].
First, consider the scenario under uncertainty before the
policy. The expected value of income to an individual who
faces the gamble involving illness-related costs is expres-
sed as:
E yð Þ ¼ ikuk y cDM;k  cDNM;k
 þ 1 ikukð Þy: ð6Þ
Second, consider the scenario under certainty, and
assume the same individual’s utility can be expressed
with a constant relative risk aversion utility function (see
above). In this certain scenario, the ‘certainty equivalent’
for the individual, that is the income she/he is willing to
have the outcome certain denoted as y is given by:
y ¼ ikuk y cDM;k  cDNM;k





Subsequently, the money-metric value of insurance (risk
premium) at the individual level is: E(y) - y* [25]. At the
population level, the insurance value is obtained after
including the coverage and the effectiveness of the policy
and with a numerical integration along the income
distribution of the population targeted.
Consider that in Land the poverty line is Pl = $600.
Individuals in the poorest and poorer income quintiles have
an income of y = $300 and y = $470, respectively; indi-
viduals in the middle quintile have an income of y = $640,
and individuals in the richer and richest quintiles have an
income of y = $810 and y = $980, respectively. In this
case, only individuals in the middle quintile could fall
under the poverty line as a result of TB: 3200 of them
would be ‘impoverished’ by TB-related costs. Hence, with
UPF for TB treatment, 3200 poverty cases (i.e., BFRP)
would be averted, all being in the middle-income group.
2.5 Quantifying the Total Costs of the Policy
ECEA calculates the total net costs owing to implementation
of the policy from the perspective of the policy maker (i.e.,
usually the government), and these costs can notably vary by
population subgroup. ECEA exactly pursues the same
approach as in a traditional CEA except that it examines the
net costs procured across k population subgroups in lieu of
one overall population in the case of CEA.As in aCEA, if the
intervention procured is a preventive intervention, the esti-
mation of the net costs (costs of the intervention minus cost
savings as a result of disease averted) are estimated.
In Land, UPF for TB treatment would be provided to
50 % of the TB-infected individuals at a unit cost of
c = $100. Hence, the net costs to the government would
be:
C ¼ 0:50  8000; 6000; 4000; 2000; 0f g  $100
¼ $ 400000; 300000; 200000; 100000; 0f g: ð8Þ
The total net costs to the government would be $1
million.
3 Extended Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: Findings
and Interpretation
ECEA examines four dimensions disaggregated per k
population subgroups: health gains, private expenditures
averted, FRP afforded, and the net costs of the policy.
Usually, ECEA displays the three outcomes of health
gains, private expenditures crowded out, and FRP, by
population stratum (Fig. 3). Furthermore, the two major
outcomes of ECEA, health gains and financial protection
per population stratum, can be scaled with the net cost of
the policy to a particular budget constraint or per dollar
expenditure (Fig. 4). The motivation is to enable the
expression of ECEA findings in terms of the ‘efficient
purchase’ of financial protection and equity, in addition to
the efficient purchase of health gains, as in a traditional
CEA. In a practical sense, the analyst can define a financial





For instance, in the case of UPF for TB treatment, this
would yield an FRP ICER of $313 per poverty case averted
(from a total cost of UPF for TB of $1 million and 3200
poverty cases averted).
In this respect, ECEA can compare a range of policies
and interventions along the two following efficiency cri-
teria: (1) health benefits and (2) FRP (Fig. 5). In doing so,
ECEA enables the inclusion of multiple criteria into the
decision-making process. Importantly, it enables the design
of health insurance benefits packages, based on the quan-
titative inclusion of information on how much FRP can be
bought, in addition to how much health can be bought, per
dollar expenditure on healthcare. Depending on policy
makers’ and users’ preferences, one could directly select
and optimize the choice of the benefits packages.
Some health policies will rank higher on health gains or
financial protection relative to the other. ECEA allows
policy makers to take both health and non-health outcomes
into account when making decisions and thus to more
effectively target scarce healthcare resources towards
specific policy objectives. For example, financial protec-
tion provided through risk pooling may be the rationale to
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include an intervention, while a desire to increase coverage
and decrease mortality may be the rationale for another.
Understanding this distinction can be critical to achieve
either goal. The ECEA approach also provides policy
makers information on how they might sequence the
development of healthcare packages as the health and
financial needs of populations evolve and resource envel-
opes change, which is especially relevant in the context of
addressing the epidemiological transition and moving
toward universal health coverage [49].
Last, ECEA stresses the poverty reduction benefits of
health policies. In doing so, it provides quantitative infor-
mation that enables the comparison of health policy impact
with other sectors outside of health (e.g., education, agri-
culture, transport), of particular relevance for economic
development and ministries of finance in low- and middle-
income countries. In this respect, ECEA can provide crit-
ical insight into how to select and sequence the health
services to be provided on the path towards achievement of
the sustainable development goals.
(b)(a)
(c)
Rotavirus deaths averted in Ethiopia
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Private expenditures averted in Ethiopia



























Fig. 3 Estimated distribution across income quintiles in Ethiopia of:
(a) rotavirus-related deaths averted; (b) rotavirus-related private
expenditures crowded out; and (c) financial risk protection afforded
(measured by a money-metric value of insurance), with universal
public finance of rotavirus immunization. Source: based on estimates
from [48]
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4 Discussion
We presented a tutorial for conducting ECEA using a
simplified example. ECEA provides quantitative methods
for HPA, and further assesses the health and financial
consequences of policies, including FRP and disaggregated
outcomes per population stratum of interest.
The ECEA approach permits the inclusion of non-health
benefits (financial protection) and distributional conse-
quences and equity in the economic evaluation of health
policies. It enables the consideration of key criteria into the
resource allocation problem and into the design of the
health benefits package. Focusing on three distinct out-
comes and their distributions, ECEA can quantify the
returns on investment (per $ spent) along the dimensions of
poverty reduction, health benefits, and gains among the
bottom 40 % of populations. When two policies exhibit
similar returns on health benefits, ECEA can point to the
policy that provides greater poverty reduction or larger
improvements for the bottom 40 %. Likewise, if poverty
reduction or improving outcomes for the bottom 40 % is a
major policy objective, ECEA can identify the policy
investments that bring the greatest impact along these two
dimensions. Similarly, ECEA can explicitly point to the
tradeoffs that may arise between increased health benefits
and promoting FRP and equity.
ECEA studies are highly context specific and depend
substantially on the local epidemiology of the setting (e.g.,
the endemicity and the distribution of diseases), the health
system infrastructure and constraints (e.g., the presence and
the distribution of health facilities), the wealth of the
population (e.g., a low- vs. middle- vs. high-income
country) and the underlying financial arrangements (e.g.,
the existence of social insurance or community-based
insurance programs). Therefore, ECEA studies can be data
intensive, requiring most importantly disaggregated inputs
per specific population subgroups and out-of-pockets costs
borne by individuals and their families. In particular, the
inclusion of FRP into economic evaluations may not be so
relevant in countries that have universal health insurance
and where individuals are protected from medical impov-
erishment. Yet, in such countries, ECEA could still point to
the financial protection benefits of specific interventions
once being included into insurance schemes.
As mentioned previously, ECEA fundamentally builds on
CEA. Therefore, the general approach to CEA including the
adherence to standard health economic methods and guideli-
nes [2, 50] remains identical. For instance, the same uncer-
tainty analyses, such as probabilistic sensitivity analysis, can
be used for ECEA as for CEA. Uncertainty in ECEA could be
well characterized (e.g., with the use of 95 % uncertainty



































Fig. 4 Deaths averted and financial risk protection (measured by a
money-metric value of insurance) afforded with universal public
finance for rotavirus immunization, per $1 million spent, India
(vaccine price of $5.0) and Ethiopia (vaccine price of $0.40). Income
quintiles: I = poorest, II = poorer, III = middle, IV = richer, V =
richest. Source: based on estimates from [48]
Fig. 5 Financial risk protection afforded (poverty cases averted) vs.
health gains (deaths averted), per $100,000 spent (in 2011 US$), for
each of nine interventions provided through universal public finance
in Ethiopia. Source: adapted from [28]
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ranges) around both outcomes and distributions, aiming for
example to compare uncertain policies with likely large ben-
efits against more certain policies with likely small benefits.
Yet, new issues arise with ECEA, essentially related to the
illness-related costs faced by individuals and income. Most
ECEAs conducted so far have restricted such private illness-
related costs to out-of-pocket costs including direct medical
costs and direct non-medical costs (e.g., transportation costs),
owing to data availability. Yet, when data become available,
indirect costs including productivity losses and wages fore-
gone owing to illness, as well as borrowing and consumption
smoothingover time, should be included. Furthermore,wedid
not address here the issueof theopportunity costs and assumed
incremental budget money to be available, as in growing
economies. Nonetheless, ECEA could well include opportu-
nity costs (displacement of funds fromexistingprograms), as a
result of fixed budgets within the health sector or the public
sector as a whole, for financial protection for example. As an
illustration, one could estimate the increased taxes required
for individuals to fund new interventions through public
finance.
ECEA was initially developed with the case study of
universal public finance for TB treatment in India [25],
examining health and financial outcomes per socioeco-
nomic group. However, ECEA is not solely concerned with
socioeconomic distributions and income quintiles. Impor-
tantly, ECEA was conceived to examine any type of rele-
vant disaggregation in a population. Regional and
geographical distributions, rural and urban settings, as well
as ethnic groups, sex, and marginalized populations where
health and financial outcomes may vary substantially can
be of critical interest and be the foci of ECEA studies.
Finally, the intent of ECEA is to incorporate the quantifi-
cation of non-health benefits into economic evaluations for
health, and its primary non-health benefit of interest has
been FRP. That being said, ECEA could well include
supplemental non-health benefits such as educational ben-
efits (e.g., school days gained through deworming policies),
environmental impact, or indirect effects to relatives.
ECEA initially focused on the two additional (to health
benefits) dimensions of financial protection and distribu-
tional consequences, as they are two important objectives
of health systems according to the World Health Organi-
zation [17].
5 Conclusions
ECEA is meant for HPA, specifically to evaluate the health
and financial consequences of public policies in four
domains: (1) the health gains; (2) the FRP benefits; (3) the
total costs to the policy makers; and (4) the distributional
(e.g., across socioeconomic groups) benefits. ECEA can
assess the policy impact on the prevention of medical
impoverishment and the promotion of equalization of health
among individuals. In this sense, ECEA focuses on the
higher level of health policies (e.g., public finance, taxation),
and quantitatively assesses the health and financial conse-
quences of policies, including financial protection and dis-
aggregated outcomes per population stratum of interest. The
ECEA approach permits the inclusion of non-health benefits
and distributional consequences and equity in the economic
evaluation of health policies. It enables the consideration of
key criteria into the resource allocation problem and into the
design of health benefits packages.
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Pk Population subgroup k
Cov Intervention coverage
Eff Intervention effectiveness
Dk Disease burden in population subgroup k before policy
ik Incidence of illness in population subgroup k before policy
BH,k Health gains in population subgroup k owing to policy
PEk Private expenditures incurred in population subgroup
k before policy
PEav,k Private expenditures averted in population subgroup
k owing to policy
BFRP,k Financial risk protection benefits in population subgroup
k owing to policy
uk Healthcare use in population subgroup k before policy
cDM Out-of-pocket direct medical costs
cDNM Out-of-pocket direct non-medical costs
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